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MARTA PICCHI*
PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHU-
MAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT:
SOME REMARKS ON THE OPERATIVE SOLUTIONS AT THE
EUROPEAN LEVEL AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE
MEMBER STATES. THE CASE OF ITALY
ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes European measures against torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment in order to verify their effectiveness, especially
in terms of the values that are actually being protected. First, it examines the dis-
tinction between the external and internal action of the European Union, high-
lighting ways in which the EU appears to be more attentive to combat practices of
torture in third countries than to domestic incidents and the proposals to legalize
torture made at a political level in some Member States. Then, it examines the
European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in the Cestaro versus Italy case, focusing
specifically on the fact that Italy was in breach of its obligations under Article 3 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, because the framework does not recognize torture as a crime and does not
provide instruments of deterrence to effectively prevent the execution and the
recurrence of such acts. Currently, the Italian Parliament is discussing a draft
amendment to the Criminal Code and aims at introducing the concept of torture as a
crime; however, in light of the comments made by the European Court of Human
Rights, this project questions whether the proposed solution will be able to prevent a
repeat of events similar to those that occurred in 2001 after the G8 Summit in Genoa.
I INTRODUCTION
The preeminent and unsurpassed value for a limited government is
respect for human dignity. For this reason, all international and
supranational charters of rights, ratified also by Italy, have estab-
lished both the prohibition of torture and the legal procedures to
follow when torture is apparent: from the Universal Declaration of
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Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-
vention) of 1950, to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by
the United Nations (UN) in 1984, its Optional Protocol of New York
of 2002 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(the so-called Nice Charter) of 2000.1 According to the prevailing
legal literature2 and some judicial pronouncements,3 the prohibition
of torture is also a norm of general international law and, in par-
ticular, ius cogens valid for all States in the international community,
regardless of its express provision through agreements.4
The European Union (EU)’s commitment towards human rights is
affirmed in Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),5 which
1 The Italian State is a signatory of other international charters which enshrine the
prohibition of torture and, in particular, the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 1987, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court of 1998.
2 See Erika De Wet, ‘‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norms of Jus
Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law’’, European Journal
of International Law, 15(1) (2004): pp. 97–121; Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘‘La tortura e` tra
noi? La portata dell’Art. 3 CEDU nella giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti
dell’uomo’’, in Lauso Zagato & Simona Pinton (eds.), La tortura nel nuovo mil-
lennio. La reazione del diritto (Padova: Cedam, 2010), pp. 171–192.
3 See, e.g., International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Prosecutor v. Anto
Furundzˇija, Judgment of 10 December 1998, and Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 35763/97 (Nov. 21, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. The General
Assembly of the United Nations took note of the customary nature of the
prohibition of torture in the Resolution 61/53 on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 19 December 2006.
4 See Jeffrey M. Blum & Rahlf G. Steinhardt, ‘‘Federal Jurisdiction over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-
Irala’’, Harvard International Law Journal, 22 (1981): pp. 52–113; Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006): p. 54; Antonio Marchesi, ‘‘La proibizione della tortura all’inizio del
nuovo millennio’’, in Lauso Zagato & Simona Pinton (eds.), La tortura nel nuovo
millennio. La reazione del diritto (Padova: Cedam, 2010), pp. 3–34.
5 See Rudolf Geiger, ‘‘Article 2 (Common values) TEU’’, in Rudolf Geiger, Da-
niel-Erasmus Khan & Markus Kotzur (eds.), European Union Treaties. Treaty on
European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Mu¨nchen: C.H. Beck, 2015),
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evokes the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, the rule of
law and human rights as the foundation of the EU. The prohibition
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is
expressly contemplated by Art. 4 of the Nice Charter,6 which has
assumed the same legal value as the Treaties (Art. 6, para. 1, TEU)
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and by Art. 3 of the
European Convention, which has the value of general principle
pending EU accession (Art. 6, para. 3, TEU).7 In addition, the Court
of Justice of the European Union has stated that unlike other rights,
the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment does not allow any exception.8
This paper begins by examining the distinction between the
external and internal action of the EU. As regards external action, the
contribution examines the Guidelines to European Union policy to-
wards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and the relative discipline of implementation.
With regard to internal action, the contribution focuses on the
European Union regulations concerning judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and right to asylum with particular attention to
refugee status, identifying the many critical issues that the discipline
presents.
The EU appears to be more attentive to combat practices of tor-
ture in third countries than to domestic incidents and the proposals to
legalize torture made at a political level in some Member States.
Indeed, the positive actions of the EU in this area have focused
outward partly because EU foreign policy provides for the protection
Footnote 5 continued
pp. 15–17; Luigi Fumagalli, ‘‘Commento all’art. 2 TEU’’, in Antonio Tizzano (ed.),
Trattati dell’Unione europea (Milano: Giuffre`, 2014), pp. 11–15.
6 See Marco Olivetti, ‘‘Article 4 – Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment’’, in William B.T. Mock & Gianmario Demuro
(eds.), Human Rights in Europe. Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), pp. 26–32.
7 See Rudolf Geiger, ‘‘Article 6 (Fundamental rights and principles) TEU’’, in
Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan & Markus Kotzur (eds.), European Union
Treaties. Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Mu¨nchen: C.H.
Beck, 2015), pp. 41–58.
8 See Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-5659 and
Case C-548/09 P, Bank Melli Iran v. Council of the European Union, 2011 E.C.R. I-
11381.
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of human rights among its objectives (Art. 21 TEU),9 while the
internal action of the EU is more limited due to the areas of com-
petence established in the Treaties, meaning that the management of
prisons and detention centers is a task for the Member States, while
the EU has no competence even in the definition of standard mea-
sures in this matter. This analysis will allow us to therefore make
some remarks on the effectiveness of overall measures taken at the
European level in terms of the values that are actually being pro-
tected. The contribution will highlight how, even in cases in which the
EU is able to intervene, the measures taken seem unassertive and not
completely decisive, so much so that at times only the Council of
Europe procedures to some degree make up for the inadequacies of
the EU procedures.
Nevertheless, despite multiple condemnations of the Italian State
by the European Court of Human Rights, the crime of torture has
not yet been entered in this framework.
In the second part of this paper, we begin by examining the Italian
situation especially after the ruling passed by the European Court of
Human Rights, Cestaro versus Italy, Judgment of 7 April 2015,
Application No. 6884/11 and, lastly, we shall explain the draft law
that would introduce the crime of torture.
The conclusion is that – compared to a Community framework
that is unable to impose the provision of the crime of torture in the
national law of Member States and which grants protection only for
damages by the European Court of Human Rights – there are su-
preme values which, in a Constitutional State of Law, are not yet
adequately protected.
II THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMITMENT
2.1 The Current External Action of the European Union
In 2001 (with updates in 2008 and 2012), the General Affairs Council
of EU developed the Guidelines to European Union policy towards
third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
9 See Rudolf Geiger, ‘‘Article 21 (Principles of European External Policy) TEU’’,
in Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan & Markus Kotzur (eds.), European Union
Treaties. Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Mu¨nchen: C.H.
Beck, 2015), pp. 118–122; Maria Eugenia Bartoloni & Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘‘Com-
mento all’art. 21 TEU’’, in Antonio Tizzano (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea
(Milano: Giuffre`, 2014), pp. 222–227.
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treatment or punishment, complementary to the European Union
Guidelines on the death penalty of 1998: both are based on the relevant
international norms and standards.10
The EU Guidelines on Torture covers three areas of EU activity: (1)
monitoring and reporting. In particular, the EU Heads of Mission
will draft periodic reports of the occurrence of torture and ill-treat-
ment and the measures taken to combat them, and they will also
provide periodic evaluation of the effect and impact of the EU ac-
tions; (2) assessment based on these reports and other relevant
information. The Council Working Group on Human Rights and the
relevant Geographic Working Groups will identify situations where
EU actions are called upon, agreeing on further steps or making
recommendations to higher levels; (3) concrete actions, finalized at
influencing third countries to take effective measures against torture
and ill-treatment and ensuring that the prohibition against torture
and ill-treatment is enforced.
Following the update of 2012, operational guidelines also consider
‘‘country strategies’’: wherever torture and ill-treatment are a matter
for concern, in-depth analysis of the situation regarding torture and
other ill-treatment in a given country shall be conducted, identifying
possible preventive actions and mechanisms, as well as necessary
steps to counter impunity for torture and other ill-treatment. In
addition, with regard to concrete actions, more attention shall be paid
to prevention activities and trial observation by embassy represen-
tatives sent as observers by the EU Heads of Mission where there is
reason to believe that defendants have been subjected to torture or ill-
treatment.
In the implementation of the EU Guidelines on Torture, the EU
contemplated a special system of import and export for goods used to
impart capital punishment and torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment: this is addressed by Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods
which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel,
10 See Jan Wouters & Marta Hermez, EU Guidelines on Human Rights As a
Foreign Policy Instrument: An Assessment (The Hague: Centre for the Law of EU
External Relations, 2016); Emanuela Pistoia, ‘‘La tortura nella fortezza Europa’.
Possibilita` e carenze dell’Unione europea’’, in Lauso Zagato & Simona Pinton (eds.),
La tortura nel nuovo millennio. La reazione del diritto (Padova: Cedam, 2010),
pp. 243 and 246–250.
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted under the
common commercial policy.11
Exports from and imports to the EU are generally guided by the
principle of freedom and the general prohibition of restrictions:
however, there are goods that are subject to special rules, and among
these fall those goods that can be used to inflict capital punishment,
torture or ill-treatment. The special rule set out in Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1236/2005 states that any export and any import of goods
which have no practical use other than for the purpose of capital
punishment or for the purpose of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, listed in Annex II, shall be
prohibited, irrespective of the origin of such equipment. There is only
one derogation: the competent authority may authorize an export or
an import of goods listed in Annex II if it is demonstrated that such
goods will be used for the exclusive purpose of public display in a
museum in view of their historic significance.
In addition, with regard to exports only, Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1236/2005 states that dual-use goods – i.e., goods that could be
used for the purpose of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, listed in Annex III – require
authorization to leave the customs territory of the Community. The
competent authority shall not grant any authorization when there are
reasonable grounds (international court judgments; findings of the
competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe and the EU, and
reports of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and
Punishment and of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and other
relevant information) to believe that goods listed in Annex III might
be used for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, including judicial corporal punishment, by a law
enforcement authority or any natural or legal person in a third
country.
11 See Michel Quentin, The European Union Trade Control Regime of items
which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Liege: ESU, 2015); Laura Magi, ‘‘Il commercio
di beni utilizzabili per praticare la pena di morte, la tortura e altri trattamenti dis-
umani e recenti misure comunitarie di contrasto’’, Rivista di diritto internazionale,
(2) (2007): pp. 387–413; Elisa Scorza, ‘‘Il divieto di commercio di strumenti
utilizzabili per la pena di morte, la tortura o altri trattamenti inumani o degradanti
(d.lgs. 12.1.2007 n. 11)’’, La legislazione penale, 27 (4) (2007): pp. 679–691.
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Council Regulation No. 1236/2005 has certain weaknesses: the
first of these is the fact that it only covers a limited group of goods,
especially dual-use items, despite the expansion accomplished with
implementing Regulations No. 1352/2011 and No. 775/2014.12
This Regulation also has a limited impact, failing to stem the latest
forms of torture: torture and ill-treatment remain effective with or
without the use of specific instruments, and a trade block is therefore
not the right tool to prevent such practices.
Moreover, Amnesty International and the Omega Research
Foundation have denounced some serious failures on the part of
some Member States in issuing permits for goods used for torture in
countries where the practice is known, or at least where carelessness is
displayed towards exports by their country’s companies.13
Finally, goods in transit through the EU customs territory are not
subject to authorization, nor to forms of control. The proposal for a
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Council Regulation No. 1236/2005 states that a broker shall be
prohibited from providing to any person, entity or body in a third
country brokering services in relation to goods listed in Annexes II
and III, irrespective of the origin of such goods. However, it does not
prohibit the transiting of such goods because, according to the
European Commission, information on the end-user is not usually
available to economic operators transporting the transiting goods
within the customs territory of the EU and, therefore, imposing a
prohibition on the transporter is not considered proportionate.14
12 See Amendments (No. 3 and 20) adopted by the European Parliament on 27
October 2015 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain
goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (COM(2014)0001 – C7-0014/2014 – 2014/
0005(COD)): particularly, European Parliament considers that ‘‘a targeted end-use
clause should be introduced in order for Member States to suspend or halt the
transfer of security-related items not listed in Annexes II and III that clearly have no
practical use other than for the purposes of capital punishment, torture or other
cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment, or where there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the transfer of those items would lead to the facilitation or
the commission of capital punishment, torture or other cruel, degrading or inhuman
treatment or punishment. Powers granted under the targeted end-use clause should
not extend to medical products that could be used for the purpose of capital pun-
ishment’’.
13 See Pistoia (note 10), pp. 253–254.
14 See COM(2014) 1 final – 2014/0005 (COD) of 14 January 2014, Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regu-
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2.2 The Internal Action of the European Union
The EU has not adopted specific measures to counter the use of
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by
its Member States.
2.2.1 Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
(a) Approximation of Criminal Laws and Regulations
At present, torture is not among the offences subject to leg-
islative approximation between Member States (Art. 83 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),15 that is, issue
for which the European Parliament and the Council may
establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal
offences and sanctions. However, the presence of a European
tool of harmonization of national criminal laws would exert
appropriate pressure on those States that fail to respect the
European Convention and the CAT, which impose an obligation
to introduce the crime of torture into the criminal law of the
States Parties.
(b) European Arrest Warrant
The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between
Member States (2002/584/JHA) would seem to exclude the
possibility of refusing delivery of an individual to the authorities
of a Member State where there is a serious risk that the re-
quested person may be subjected to treatment contrary to Art. 3
of the European Convention and Art. 4 of the Nice Charter. This
is because such refusal may only be made in specific cases, which
are listed exhaustively in Art. 3 (Grounds for mandatory non-
execution of the European arrest warrant) and Art. 4 (Grounds
for optional non-execution of the European arrest warrant) of the
Footnote 14 continued
lation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (para. 3.2.2).
15 See Markus Kotzur, ‘‘Article 83 (Criminal offences with a cross-border
dimension) TFEU’’, in Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus Khan & Markus Kotzur
(eds.), European Union Treaties. Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (Mu¨nchen: C.H. Beck, 2015), pp. 447–451; Chiara Amalfitano, ‘‘Commento
all’art. 83 TFEU’’, in Antonio Tizzano (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea (Milano:
Giuffre`, 2014), pp. 896–910.
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Framework Decision. However, things are different in the event
of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States;
in such cases, the ‘‘whereas’’ clause No. 10 in the preamble of
the Framework Decision permits suspension of the mechanism
of the European arrest warrant. Although the discipline of the
European arrest warrant is based on a high degree of trust be-
tween Member States, the Framework Decision must be read in
accordance with EU primary law: the same Art. 1, para. 3
explicitly states the obligation to respect the fundamental rights
and fundamental legal principles enshrined in Art. 6 of the TEU,
which cannot be changed as a result of the Framework Deci-
sion. Moreover, a judge who does not refuse the mandate in the
presence of such risks would be in violation of Art. 3 of the
European Convention and Art. 4 of the Nice Charter. The
European Commission largely adhered to this reconstruction
and considered the explicit grounds of refusal for violation of
fundamental rights or discrimination to be legitimate; however,
it pointed out that these grounds should be invoked only in
exceptional circumstances within the EU, emphasizing the
problematic aspect with respect to the principle of mutual
recognition of criminal judgments.16
The paucity of references to the protection of human rights in
the discipline of the European arrest warrant17 is due to the fact
that this institution is based, as noted, on mutual trust between
Member States18 and on the assumption that there is no place
for torture and ill-treatment in Europe, despite the fact that, in
reality, practice proves otherwise and national rules are often
characterized by ambiguity and inadequacy.19
(c) Cooperation Between Judicial Authorities
The Framework Decisions governing cooperation between
judicial authorities distinguish between those areas of criminal
justice in which cooperation does not require that the offence be
16 See Reports from the Commission of 23 February 2005 [COM(2005) 63 final]
and 24 January 2006 [COM(2006) 8 final] on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States.
17 See Nina Marlene Schallmoser, ‘‘The European Warrant and Fundamental
Rights’’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 22(2)
(2014): pp. 135–165.
18 See Massimo Fichera, ‘‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State:
A Marriage of Convenience?’’, European Law Journal, 15(1) (2009): pp. 70–97.
19 See Pistoia (note 10), pp. 254–267.
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considered a crime in both jurisdictions and those in which the
application of the dual criminality principle is to be decided by
the second State. This State, if it decides to adhere to this
principle, will ensure that the request of the foreign judicial
authority is complied with only if the offence in question can
also be prosecuted under its own national legislation. The crime
of torture, however, is not one of those areas in which the
principle of dual criminality is abandoned in favor of a simpli-
fied system of cooperation between judicial authorities.
2.2.2 Right to Asylum, Refugee Status and Repatriation
Art. 18 of the Nice Charter recognizes the right of asylum and Art. 19
sets out the limits to be observed in the event of removal, expulsion or
extradition, stating that collective expulsions are prohibited and no
one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a
serious risk of being subjected to the death penalty, torture or other
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.20
The crucial point lies in the procedures for identifying the State
responsible for examining the asylum application, provided for in
Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (Dublin
II). The Regulation contains a number of criteria to be applied, with a
clear hierarchy inorder to avert the riskof abuseof asylumclaimsby so-
called apparent refugees. However, it does not consider the possibility
that the State responsible for examining an asylumapplicationmay still
decide to reject the applicant, exposing this person to the risk of torture.
The designation of the State responsible for examining an asylum
application is not affected even by an evaluation of the treatment that
the same State may apply to the applicant.
The case law21 of the Court of Justice of the European Union is
therefore important22: recently, the Court of Justice, in line with the
20 See Pistoia (note 10), pp. 272–275.
21 See Silvia Morgades-Gil, ‘‘The Discretion of States in the Dublin III System for
Determining Responsibility for Examining Application for Asylum. What Remain
of the Sovereignty and Humanitarian Clauses After the Interpretation of the ECtHR
and the CJEU?’’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 27(3) (2015): pp. 433–456.
22 See Helene Lambert, ‘‘Protection against Refoulement from Europe: Human
Rights Law Comes to the Rescue’’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
48 (1999): pp. 514–544; Nicoletta Parisi & Dino Rinoldi, ‘‘Confini d’Europa, Stato di
diritto, diritti dell’uomo. Gerarchia e bilanciamento tra diritti fondamentali con
particolare riguardo alla condizione del migrante’’, in Lauso Zagato & Sara De Vido
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case law of the European Court of Human Rights,23 stated that a
Member State enjoys a rebuttable (not absolute) presumption of re-
spect for fundamental human rights, and particularly for the prohi-
bition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment; that
presumption can however be rebutted by any contrary evidence
provided, e.g., by authoritative international organizations and non-
governmental bodies.24 The transfer of an asylum seeker by one
Member State to another of first entry must be subjected to strict
scrutiny: Art. 4 of the Nice Charter must be interpreted as meaning
that Member States must not transfer an asylum seeker to the
Member State designated as responsible when there are serious sys-
temic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception con-
ditions for them in that country and when there are substantiated
reasons for believing that the applicant runs a real risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment. The requesting Member State may itself
examine the asylum application (Art. 3, para. 2, Council Regulation
(EC) No. 343/2003), but it can also verify the existence of an addi-
tional criterion in the Regulation that allows another Member State
to be identified as competent to examine the application for asylum:
however, the procedure for identifying the competent State must not
be such as to exacerbate the violation of the applicant’s fundamental
rights.
The Court of Justice of the European Union also maintained that
where a Member State has agreed to take charge of an asylum seeker
as a Member State of first entry into the EU, the applicant may only
challenge this decision if there are systemic deficiencies in the asylum
procedure and in the reception conditions for asylum seekers in that
Member State, as these constitute serious and proven reasons to
believe that the applicant runs a real risk of being subjected to ill-
treatment.25
Footnote 22 continued
(eds.), Il divieto di tortura e altri comportamenti inumani o degradanti nelle mi-
grazioni (Padova: Cedam, 2012), pp. 1–46.
23 See MSS v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, (Jan. 21, 2011), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
24 See Joined Cases C-411/10 N.S. and C-493/10 M.E, 2011 E.C.R. I-13905.
25 See Case C-394/12, Shamso Abdullahi v. Bundesasylamt, (Dec. 10, 2013).
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 759
Council Directive No. 2004/83/EC (the so-called Qualification
Directive) addresses subsidiary protection.26 This measure seeks to
overcome the stringent requirements for the acquisition of refugee
status, extending its system of protection to persons not in possession
of such requirements: the criteria for subsidiary protection include
the real risk of suffering serious harm, including torture and other
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In this
regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that the
existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an
applicant for subsidiary protection does not require proof that he/she
is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his/her per-
sonal circumstances. In exceptional cases, the existence of such a
threat is established where the degree of indiscriminate violence
characterizing the armed conflict taking place reaches such a high
level as to suggest that any civilian, returned to the country or region
in question, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm merely by
their presence in the territory.27 The Court of Justice of the European
Union also clarified the meaning of Art. 12, para. 2, of the Qualifi-
cation Directive, i.e., whether the membership of an organization
included in a list attached to the Common Position of the Council of
27 December 2001 (2001/931/CFSP) on the application of specific
measures to combat terrorism is sufficient to exclude the recognition
of refugee status. The Court of Justice of the European Union stated
that refugee status may be denied only after an individual examina-
tion of the specific facts in order to verify the existence of reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has individual responsibility for
having committed a serious non-political crime or an act contrary to
the purposes and principles of the UN.28 Moreover, the Court of
Justice reaffirmed that the competent authorities must assess whether
the applicant runs a real risk of being criminally persecuted or sub-
jected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.29
26 See Gregor Noll, ‘‘Evidentiary Assessment in Refugee Status Determination
and the EU Qualification Directive’’, European Public Law, 12(2) (2006): pp. 295–
318.
27 See Case C-465/07, Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van
Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-921.
28 See Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Germany v. B and D, 2010 E.C.R.
I-10979.
29 See Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and
Z, (Sept. 5, 2012); Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, X, Y and Z v.
Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, (Nov. 7, 2013).
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The new Qualification Directive (No. 2011/95/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council)30 pays more attention to the clarifi-
cations of the Court of Justice of the European Union and introduces
important further changes31: however, the European Commission
considered it unnecessary to include details regarding the interpre-
tation doubts analyzed in the Elgafaji judgment, even if it would
perhaps be appropriate to reduce the variation in implementation by
each Member State.
Finally, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 (the
so-called Asylum Procedures Directive)32 also creates problems of
interpretation through its ambivalent character: the controversial
element is the use of the notion of safe countries to determine the
inadmissibility of an application for asylum, and, in particular, the
eligibility of a list of countries which are deemed as safe. Indeed,
although the term appears consistent because it adheres to the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention and to the
prohibition of removal in violation of the right to freedom from
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, there is cause for
concern in the preparation of lists based on a theoretical and pro-
tracted evaluation by individual States.
The EU, on account of the increase in migration flows of recent
years, seems to have adopted a less favorable policy of support to
refugees,33 despite the Stockholm Programme 2010/2014’s emphasis
on the need for a common area of protection and solidarity, founded
30 See Jonah Eaton, ‘‘The Internal Protection Alternative Under European Union
Law: Examining the Recast Qualification Directive’’, International Journal of
Refugee Law, 24(4) (2012): pp. 765–792.
31 See David Kosar, ‘‘Inclusion before Exclusion or Vice Versa: What the Qual-
ification Directive and the Court of Justice Do (Not) Say’’, International Journal of
Refugee Law, 25(1) (2013): pp. 87–119.
32 See Cathryn Costello, ‘‘The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation
of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of Interna-
tional Protection?’’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 7(1) (2005): pp. 35–70.
33 See Directives of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013,
No. 2013/32/EU, on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international
protection (recast) and No. 2013/33/EU, laying down standards for the reception of
applicants for international protection (recast), and Regulations (EU) of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, No. 603/2013, on the estab-
lishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints and No. 604/2013 (the so-called
Dublin III), establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast),
amending Dublin II.
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on a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those that
have obtained international protection, based on high standards of
protection and fair and effective procedures.
In general, reception procedures have not improved, while use of
‘‘administrative detention’’ measures or limitations on freedom of
movement has increased. In addition, there has been a confirmation
of the old principle that formed the basis of the Dublin Convention of
1990 and the Dublin II: i.e., as a rule, every asylum application must
be examined by a single Member State and that the competent
country is the State of entry of the applicant.
However, taking into account the case law of the Court of Justice
of the European Union, Art. 3, para. 2, of Regulation No. 604/2013
states that where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the
Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in
that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment pursuant to Art. 4 of the Nice Charter, the determining
Member State shall continue to examine the criteria in order to
establish whether another Member State can be designated as
responsible. Moreover, where the transfer cannot be made to any
Member State, the determining Member State shall become the
responsible Member State.
There are further limits in this new discipline: the State responsible
for examining the request of the applicant coincides, as a rule, with
the one in which the refugee will remain when he/she is granted
protection, without the possibility of a transfer coordinated with
other Member States and without an evaluation conducted by a
specifically designated third party. However, the recent state of
emergency in Italy has highlighted the need for solutions that allow,
despite the opposition of some States, an effective ‘‘redistribution of
refugees’’ between Member States, irrespective of the country of first
entry.
Directive No. 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals
(the so-called Returns Directive)34 gives rise to other considerations,
34 See Anneliese Baldaccini, ‘‘The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants
under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive’’, European Journal of
Migration and Law, 11(1) (2009): pp. 1–17.
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as it seems more attentive to human rights and the principle of non-
refoulement of irregular migrants.
The measures to combat the phenomenon of illegal immigration
include readmission agreements whereby parties agree to readmit
their own nationals into their territories when they have been found
illegally in the territory of another Contracting Party. The conclusion
of these agreements requires the approval of the European Parlia-
ment, and the agreements share structural similarities: in particular,
to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of migrants, the
preamble usually includes references to human rights and the main
international agreements on the subject.
In this regard, the European Commission’s proposal,35 whereby
future agreements would include clauses allowing the EU to unilat-
erally terminate the agreement where there is a risk of serious and
persistent violation of human rights of readmitted persons, is inad-
equate because it is not a dissuasive solution: on the contrary, it could
encourage partner countries to engage in human rights violations in
order to avoid readmitting irregular immigrants found in the coun-
tries of the EU, since the purpose of the agreement is restraining
illegal immigration from third countries to European countries and
not vice versa. In these cases, Member States should not send these
migrants away to third countries, as there are other solutions: general
international law provides the most effective tools of reaction, such as
the suspension of agreements other than those regarding readmis-
sion.36
Moreover, the way to reduce the risk of violation of migrants’
human rights is to (essentially) conclude readmission agreements only
with States that are Parties of the major treaties on the protection of
human rights, and to provide for a post-repatriation control mech-
anism to monitor and obtain information on the situation of persons
readmitted.
35 See COM(2011) 76 final of 23 February 2011, Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament and the Council on Evaluation of EU Readmission
Agreements.
36 See Nils Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and
Refugee Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Stefano Nicolin,
‘‘Contrasto all’immigrazione irregolare negli accordi di riammissione dell’Unione
europea’’, in Lauso Zagato & Sara De Vido (eds.), Il divieto di tortura e altri
comportamenti inumani o degradanti nelle migrazioni (Padova: Cedam, 2012), pp.
203–234.
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2.3 Some Remarks
At this point, we can make a few comments with regard to internal
and external actions of the EU and, in particular, evaluate the
effectiveness and adequacy of the measures implemented in order to
repress the practices of torture. However, before doing so, it is useful
to briefly cite two recent resolutions of the European Parliament.
The European Parliament, in the Resolution of 27 February 2014
on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012),
expresses its alarm at the persistence of instances of violation of
human dignity in the Union and in its Member States, whose victims
include minorities (Roma in particular), asylum-seekers, migrants,
people suspected of having links with terrorism and people who are
deprived of their freedom, as well as vulnerable groups and impov-
erished people, stressing that public authorities must abide by the
absolute prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, as well as carry out swift, effective and independent in-
depth investigations into any breach and prosecute those responsible.
The numerous instances of ill-treatment by police and law
enforcement officers, particularly in relation to the disproportionate
use of force against peaceful participants and journalists in connec-
tion with demonstrations, and the excessive use of non-lethal weap-
ons, are of great concern since the primary role of the police forces is
to guarantee the safety and protection of people.
Moreover, the European Parliament reiterates its call for a full
investigation into collaboration by European States in the ‘‘extraor-
dinary rendition’’ program of the United States and the CIA, flights
and secret prisons within the territory of the EU, and insists that
Member States must perform effective, impartial, in-depth, inde-
pendent and transparent investigations and that there is no place for
impunity, since the ban on torture is absolute and, therefore, State
secrecy cannot be invoked to limit the obligation on States to
investigate serious human rights violations. Indeed, the European
Parliament further stressed that respect for fundamental rights and
the rule of law is an essential element in successful counterterrorism
policies.37
37 See European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2015 on the US Senate
report on the use of torture by the CIA, European Parliament resolution of 21 January
2016 on the EU’s priorities for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
session in 2016 and European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2016 on follow-up to
the resolution of Parliament of 11 February 2015 on the US Senate report on the use of
torture by the CIA.
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Later, the European Parliament, in the Resolution of 11 March
2014 on the eradication of torture in the world, observes that the
implementation of the EU Guidelines on Torture remains insufficient
and is at odds with EU statements and commitments to addressing
torture as a matter of priority, pointing out the need for a revision of
the action plan in order to define more ambitious and specific actions
for eradicating torture.38
The European Parliament believes that the EU should adopt more
decisive positions and calls on the EU institutions and Member States
to strengthen their commitment and political will in order to achieve
a worldwide moratorium on capital punishment. Furthermore, the
European Parliament calls on the European Commission to draw up
an action plan with a view to creating a mechanism for listing and
imposing targeted sanctions (travel bans, freezing of assets, etc.)
against officials of third countries involved in grave human rights
violations, such as torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment.
The developed analysis and the two European Parliament reso-
lutions give rise to some thoughts: first, contrary to the claims of
some commentators, the EU commitment against torture and other
ill-treatment is often cloaked in hypocrisy, both in policies towards
third countries and in internal policies, since the operative solutions
are not entirely effective or adequate. The European Parliament has
clearly expressed its alarm, although it sometimes takes an ambigu-
ous position: when the European Parliament refers to the different
forms of use of force by police, without using the terms torture or ill-
treatment, it seems to be identifying something other than torture and
ill-treatment, i.e., forms of violence that have less negative impact.
As for the action directed towards third countries, its limitations
arise not only from inadequate operative solutions but also from the
fact that the goals presuppose the effective cooperation of these third
countries.
Regarding the internal action of the EU, it is necessary to reiterate
that the legalization of torture (in extreme cases) in the Member
States39 (although all of them have agreed to the various interna-
38 See, in the same direction, European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2015 on
the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2013 and the
European Union’s policy on the matter.
39 See Niklas Luhmann, Gibt es in unserer Gesellschaft noch unverzichtbare
Normen? (Heidelberg: C.F. Mu¨ller, 1993); Winfried Brugger, ‘‘Darf der Staat aus-
nahmsweise foltern?’’, Der Staat, 35 (1996): pp. 67–97. Particularly, some proposals
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 765
tional agreements aimed at the eradication of torture) is absolutely
contrary with the principles endorsed by European primary law (Art.
2 TEU) and with the provisions of the Nice Charter and the European
Convention. However, it must be emphasized that the instruments
used at the European level to prevent these practices appear inade-
quate in some respects and relatively underused in others.
They are inadequate because, where there is a clear risk of a
serious breach of the values of Art. 2 TEU or of serious and persistent
breach by a Member State of the same values, the procedures de-
scribed in Art. 7 TEU – which can involve, in the first instance, the
adoption of recommendations to the Member State and, in the sec-
ond, the suspension of certain rights deriving from the Treaties to the
Member State – seem difficult to apply due to the fact that ‘‘the grave
breach’’ is understood as a constant, or at least recurrent, behavior:
therefore, it does not cover individual instances spread out over time.
They are not fully exploited because, even when there is room for
intervention – e.g., by including the crime of torture among those
subject to common minimum standards, or in the case of simplified
judicial cooperation – the will to intervene seems to be lacking, de-
spite the positions taken by the European Parliament. Nevertheless,
these solutions would have positive effects: first, the Member States
should introduce the crime of torture and secondly, they should pay
more attention to cases of abuse in the use of force.
Consequently, doubt arises (even in view of some proposals made
at the political level in some Member States) as to whether, at the
base of EU policy on the subject, there is already a latent distinction
between the forms of torture or ill-treatment that must be rejected
and the use of coercive means that may in some circumstances be
accepted, or upon which an explicit definitive position is not assumed.
Footnote 39 continued
to legalize torture in extreme cases have been advanced after the notorious Jakob von
Metzler case: the child von Metzler was kidnapped for ransom and the police
threatened to torture the alleged offender in the hope, unfortunately in vain, to find
the child still alive. See Jan P. Reemtsma, Folter im Rechtsstaat? (Hamburg:
Hamburger Edition, 2005). In general, the debate on the legalization of torture in
extreme cases is again today renewed after the terrorist attacks that started in 2001:
Alan Morton Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat,
Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Richard A.
Posner, Not a Suicide Pact. The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2013); Gerald Lang, ‘‘Legitimating Torture?’’, Criminal Law
and Philosophy, (2015): pp. 1–19.
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A full cultural evolution has yet to take place: the belief is still held
that, in certain cases, a minimum degree of violence may be necessary
and that, in any case, the evaluation of this necessity must remain at
the domestic level.
III THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE IN THE CASE LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
THE CASE OF ITALY40
3.1 The Condemnation of Italy for Violation of the Prohibition of
Torture
Although the Italian Constitution states that ‘‘Any acts of physical or
moral violence against persons subject to restrictions of personal
liberty are to be punished’’ (Art. 13, para. 4),41 Italy has not yet
introduced the crime of torture in criminal law, contrary to the ex-
press provisions of Art. 1 of the CAT42 and Art. 3 (Prohibition of
Torture) of the European Convention.43 For years, the Committee
40 See Marta Picchi, ‘‘The Condemnation of the Italian State for Violation of the
Prohibition of Torture. Remarks on the Ruling passed by the European Court of
Human Rights, Section IV, 7 April 2015, Application No. 6884/11, case of Cestaro v.
Italy’’, GSTF-Journal of Law and Social Sciences 4(1) (2015): pp. 27–31.
41 See Marco Ruotolo, ‘‘Brevi riflessioni su una recente proposta per l’introduzione
del delitto di tortura nell’ordinamento italiano’’, in Anna Maria Nico (ed.), Studi in
onore di Francesco Gabriele (Bari: Cacucci, 2016), pp. 891-896; Andrea Pugiotto,
‘‘Repressione penale della tortura e Costituzione: anatomia di un reato che non c’e`’’,
Diritto Penale Contemporaneo (2) (2014): pp. 129–152.
42 See Jan Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention
against Torture. A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1988); Elisabeth McArthur & Manfred Nowak, The United Nations Convention
Against Torture: A Commentary (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2008).
43 See Donna Gomien, David Harris & Leo Zwaak, Law and Practice of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter (Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1998); Francis G. Jacobs & Robin C.A. White,
The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014); David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Ed Bates & Carla Buckley, Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014);
Viviana Piccioni, ‘‘Art. 3, Divieto di tortura’’, in Claudio Defilippi, Debora Bosi &
Rachel Harvey (eds.), La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e delle liberta`
fondamentali (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2006), pp. 107–135; Antonio
Balsamo, ‘‘L’Art. 3 della CEDU e il sistema italiano – The Statute of Limitation in
the Italian Criminal Legal System requires to be amended’’, Cassazione penale (11)
(2014): pp. 3925–3937.
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against Torture44 of the UN and the Committee for the Prevention of
Torture,45 a body of the Council of Europe, have repeatedly criticized
and denounced this omission46 while the European Court of Human
Rights has ascertained on several occasions the Italy’s responsibility
for the violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and the use of
inhuman or degrading treatment.47
The European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Cestaro
versus Italy case, passed on 7 April 2015, is a further condemnation
of the Italian State not only for the substantive violation of Art. 3 of
the European Convention, but also for the lack of an effective criminal
law that prosecutes the acts of torture committed.
3.1.1 Facts and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
In its ruling, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously
agreed that there had been a violation of Art. 3 of the European
Convention on account of ill-treatment sustained by the applicant
during events which occurred at the end of the G8 Summit in Genoa
in July 2001 in the Diaz-Pertini School, whose building was made
44 See Report of the Committee against Torture of 1 December 2007 (A/62/44,
para. 40 C), where the Committee reiterated its previous recommendation (A/54/44,
para. 169 a) ‘‘that the State party proceed to incorporate into domestic law the crime
of torture and adopt a definition of torture that covers all the elements contained in
article 1 of the Convention. The State party should also ensure that these offences are
punished by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature, as set
out in article 4, paragraph 2, of the Convention’’.
45 See Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment from 13 to 25 May 2012, p. 8 (Strasbourg, 19 November
2013).
46 See Rod Morgan & Malcolm D. Evans, Combating Torture in Europe: the
Work and Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
(CPT) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2001); Novella Ricciuti, ‘‘Il
Comitato europeo contro la tortura e la prassi italiana dei respingimenti verso la
Libia’’, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale (3) (2010): pp. 673–678.
47 The first condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights is Labita vs.
Italy, App. No. 26772/95, (6 Apr. 2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. After this, the
European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Art. 3 of the European
Convention by the Italian State in a growing number of cases: recently, it can cite the
rulings of M. and Others vs. Italy and Bulgaria, App. No. 40020/03, (31 Jul. 2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/, and Torreggiani and Others vs. Italy, App. No. 43517/09,
46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 and 37818/10, (8 Jan. 2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. Finally, the Italian State was again sentenced to the
violation of Art. 3 of the European Convention in the Nasr and Ghali vs. Italy case,
App. No. 44883/09, (23 Feb. 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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available at the time by the municipal authorities for demonstrators
to use as a night shelter. On the nights of the 21st and the 22nd of
July an anti-riot police unit entered the building to carry out a search,
leading to acts of violence.
(a) The Material Violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
First of all, the European Court of Human Rights refers to the
definition of torture contained in the CAT48 and the evolution of
this concept in the case law of the Court itself49: in light of this
reconstruction, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
the violence committed in the Diaz-Pertini School, of which the
applicant is a victim, had a punitive function as well as being an
act of retaliation aimed to cause humiliation, pain and suffering
of the victims. Therefore, these forms of violence have the
characteristics of real torture, pursuant to Art. 1 of the CAT.50
The violence inflicted on the applicant was deemed as involving
particularly serious acts of cruelty, because it was completely
gratuitous as the victim did not pose any resistance: i.e., the
police abused their position of power, and committed a delib-
erate and premeditated act, devoid of any foundation.51 This is
demonstrated not only by punitive irruption into the Diaz-
Pertini School, but also by the subsequent efforts of the national
authorities to justify the search of premises and arrests on the
basis of false evidence, e.g., simulating the discovery in the
school’s courtyard of two Molotov cocktails.52
48 The Art. 1, para. 1, states that ‘‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term
‘‘torture’’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.’’
49 See Cestaro v. Italy, App. No. 6884/11, paras. 171–176 (7 Apr. 2015), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
50 Id., para. 177.
51 Id., paras. 179–183.
52 Id., para. 184.
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As a result, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that all
the facts indicate that the treatment contrary to human dignity
suffered by the applicant should be qualified as torture.53
(b) The Infringement of Article 3 of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the
Procedural Side
According to the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, mere compensation is not enough to overcome the vic-
tim status; instead, it is necessary to punish those responsible for
acts of torture.54 In this way, the European Court of Human
Rights identifies the second aspect of the responsibility of Italy
in accordance with the procedural requirements of Art. 3 of the
European Convention55: indeed, each contracting country has to
carry out effective investigations into all cases of material breach
of this article, in order to identify, prosecute and convict
accordingly those responsible for acts of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment.56
The European Court of Human Rights states that only the
Italian judicial authorities can sanction sentence reductions or
legal allowances for perpetrators of torture: however, pursuant
to Art. 19 of the European Convention and in accordance with
the principle that the Convention is both a theoretical and
practical guarantee, the European Court of Human Rights rules
that it must monitor and intervene when there is a clear dis-
crepancy between the gravity of the act and the penalty im-
posed.57 Moreover, in cases of torture committed by State
officials, criminal proceedings should never become extinct
through the statute of limitation, while amnesty and pardon
should never be granted for this type of crime nor should the
sentence be suspended.58
It is therefore necessary that each contracting State to the
European Convention introduces provisions of criminal law, in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 3 of the European Con-
53 Id., para. 190.
54 Id., paras. 230–231.
55 See Christoph Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights –
Commentary (Mu¨nchen: C.H. Beck, 2014), pp. 40–42.
56 Id., paras. 204–206.
57 Id., para. 207.
58 Id., para. 208.
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vention, while, in terms of disciplinary measures, the European
Court of Human Rights considers that, when the perpetrators
are State officials, it is important that these are suspended
during the period of investigation and trial and are permanently
removed if convicted.59
In the present case, the European Court of Human Rights has
found a number of violations of the positive obligations under
Art. 3 of the European Convention: the police did not cooperate
with the investigating authorities to identify the perpetrators of
violence and the Italian Government has yet to respond to re-
quests for information regarding the necessary suspension from
duty of police officers subjected to criminal proceedings.60
In any case, the most serious aspect is the impunity of the au-
thors: the defendants were sentenced to prison terms by the
national courts for minor offences of forgery, which were
committed with the intent to conceal the facts of torture, while
in regards to offences of intentional injury, beatings, private
violence and abuse of office, they have benefited from the lim-
itation of actions and a sentence reduction as determined by the
pardon governed by Law No. 241/2006.61
Consequently, the European Court of Human Rights found that
the authorities were incompetent in their response to such
serious acts: however, this result cannot be imputed to the
shortcomings or negligence of the public prosecutor’s office or
the domestic courts.62 The problem has a structural nature: the
present case had proved that Italian criminal legislation does
not recognize torture and is devoid of the necessary deterrent
effect to prevent other similar violations of Art. 3 in the future.63
The European Court of Human Rights pointed out that the
State’s positive obligations under Art. 3 of the European Con-
vention include the duty to introduce a properly adapted legal
framework, including effective criminal law provisions.64
Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights concluded
that the Italian legal system should be endowed with the legal
59 Id., para. 209.
60 Id., paras. 214–217 and 227–228.
61 Id., paras. 219–222.
62 Id., paras. 223–224.
63 Id., para. 225.
64 Id., para. 243.
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means to ensure the appropriate punishment of perpetrators of
acts of torture or other ill-treatment under Art. 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention and be empowered to prevent perpetrators of
torture from benefiting from measures of relief that are contrary
to the Court’s case law.65
3.2 The Bill Before the Italian Parliament
The Italian Parliament must then recognize torture as a crime,
without delay, in order to ensure effective respect for human dignity
and prevent the further compromise of the Italian State’s interna-
tional credibility.
The bill before Parliament66 includes an introduction to the con-
cept of torture as a crime under Art. 613-bis of the Penal Code:
‘‘Whoever, with violence or threat or violation of his obligations of
protection, care and assistance, intentionally causes a person en-
trusted to him, or at least under his authority, supervision or custody,
acute physical or mental suffering in order to obtain information or
statements, or as a form of punishment, or as a means to curb
resistance, or for any reason based on ethnicity, sexual orientation or
political or religious opinions, shall be punished with imprisonment
from four to ten years. If the facts mentioned in the first paragraph
are committed by a public official or a person responsible for a public
service, with abuse of authority, or in violation of the duties inherent
to the function or service, the applied punishment will be imprison-
ment from five to fifteen years’’.67
The bill provides for the introduction of aggravating circum-
stances if the acts committed lead to the unintended consequence of
death, establishing an increase of two-thirds of the sentence; while, if
the perpetrator intentionally causes death, the penalty is life impris-
onment. Moreover, Art. 613-ter introduces the crime of instigation of
a public official to commit torture.
While the sentencing for the crime of torture is subject to a statute
of limitation, the period of time within which proceedings must be
instituted doubles the penalty prescribed by the law: therefore, the
crime of torture is extinguished after a period of 20 years, or after
65 Id., para. 246.
66 The bill No. 2168 was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 9 April 2015
and is currently before the Senate of the Republic.
67 Trans. mine.
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30 years when it is committed by a public official or a person
responsible for a public service.
The bill also enshrines the ban on the use of statements obtained
through the crime of torture and the prohibition to expel or return
migrants when it is assumed that, in the countries of origin, they are
subjected to torture. Finally, diplomatic agents under investigation or
sentence in their country of origin for this offence would be stripped
of their diplomatic immunity.
3.3 Critical Considerations to the Draft Law
The legislature would introduce a wider configuration of the crime of
torture than required by the CAT because, next to the most serious
offence committed by a public official or a person responsible for a
public service (para. 2), the crime of torture committed by private
persons is also contemplated (para. 1). This solution is satisfactory
because it would fully respect the positive obligations of prevention to
which each State Party must comply, in accordance with Art. 3 of the
European Convention.
However, the legislature still fails to address all aspects of torture.
First, the provision of the law before Parliament circumscribes the
victims of the crime only to the people entrusted to the police officer,
or otherwise subjected to his authority, supervision or custody, thus
excluding the possibility of recognizing the existence of the offence, in
the case of serious violence, freely aimed at causing suffering to the
victims, perpetrated by the police in the operations of public policy
before the victims fall under the authority of the police. This provi-
sion would therefore fail to recognize instances of torture similar to
the acts committed in the Diaz-Pertini School, a case that only be-
came classified as torture once it was recognized as such by the
European Court of Human Rights. As a result, this provision would
not be able to punish and prevent the commission of new facts similar
to those condemned by the European Court of Human Rights.
However, it would expose Italy to further future international
responsibilities because the proposed solution would be inconsistent
with the obligations under the CAT.
Another critical point is the description of the conduct because the
provision requires the use of ‘‘violence or threat’’: torture is often
performed without the use of these modes, so it would be preferable
to structure the offence to a ‘‘free form’’ as required by the CAT.
Similarly, the request for a specific intent, i.e., the fact that the
performed behavior aimed toward a specific purpose, fails to identify
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cases of intentional infliction of physical or moral suffering executed
without any apparent purpose, but only for revenge or sadism:
bringing to mind, once again, the events of the Diaz-Pertini School.
With regards to offences that are committed by a public official or
a person responsible for a public service, the legislature still does not
rule out possible allowances for the accused on the basis of extenu-
ating circumstances, even though it does outline an appropriate
maximum penalty. Consequently, those responsible for these crimes
could benefit from reduced sentences.
Finally, the draft law does not exclude the applicability of exon-
eration, in contrast with the provisions of the CAT (Art. 2, paras. 2
and 3), nor does it preclude the statute of limitation and the appli-
cability of amnesty or pardon, unlike the reconstruction entrenched
in case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In fact,
according to the international order, the condemnation of torture has
an absolute and imperative value because neither a state of war,
threat of war nor internal political instability can be invoked as a
justification for torture (CAT, Art. 2, para. 2)68: the prohibition of
torture does not allow exceptions, limitations, compensations, nor
any derogation (European Convention, Art. 15, para. 2).69
68 See Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, ‘‘Criminalisation of Torture: State Obliga-
tions under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’’, European Human Rights Law
Review, (2) (2006): pp. 115–141; Cristiana Fioravanti, ‘‘Divieto di Tortura e ordi-
namento italiano: sempre in contrasto con obblighi internazionali?’’, Quaderni
costituzionali, (3) (2004): pp. 555–568; Barbara Concolino, ‘‘Divieto di tortura e
sicurezza nazionale: il no della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo al bilanciamento
nei casi di espulsione di presunti terroristi’’, Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed
Europeo, (3) (2008): pp. 1109–1117.
69 The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Khashiyev and Akayeva
v. Russia, App. No. 57942/00 and 57945/00, para. 170 (24 Feb. 2005), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/, ruled that ‘‘article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of
democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight
against terrorism and organized crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the
substantive clauses of the Convention and its Protocols, Article 3 makes no provision
for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15, para. 2 even
in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation’’. In the same
sense, see recently Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, App. No. 44883/09, para. 280 (23 Feb.
2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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IV EVALUATION SUMMARY
The legal literature has emphasized that the use of torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment – along with authoritarian tenden-
cies, the return to forms of racism and the absence of standards of
social equity – are an index of the regressive nature of time, char-
acterized in that ‘‘rights seem to have a price’: the price of so-called
public safety’’.70
It is a sort of inversion of values: the guarantee of freedoms and
fundamental rights, at times, is seen as an obstacle to the protection
of other values considered to be more important, such as security.
Ensuring security is no longer understood as functional to the pro-
tection of fundamental rights, instead, in sharp contrast with these, it
is used to explain the recent debate on the legalization of torture.
National interest is once more taking prevalence over the founding
principles of the rule of law.71
In addition to these reasons that characterize the policy choices of
many countries, there are other explanations for the delay in the
recognition of torture as a crime in Italian law: the express provision
of this offence would be capable of eroding the impunity that is still
enjoyed by some officials and public officers. There are additional
reasons: policies targeted at illegal or undocumented immigrants
would need to be abandoned and the current penitentiary system
would also need to be reviewed.
Nevertheless, in a Constitutional State of Law, the dignity of each
individual is the supreme value, meaning that they cannot be treated
as a means to achieve an end that transcends them: therefore, torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment can never be justified because
they dehumanize both the victims and the perpetrators.
Torture is a brutal and disturbing reality, more or less hidden and
close to home,72 yet while it is often ignored, it is an issue that must
be addressed in the social, political and legal spheres, and accom-
panied by a comprehensive public campaign to inform on its asso-
ciated risks.
70 See Marina Lalatta Costerbosa, ‘‘Per una storia critica della tortura’’, Materiali
per una storia della cultura giuridica (1) (2011): p. 33, [trans. mine].
71 See Parisi & Rinoldi, (note 22).
72 See Patrizio Gonnella, La tortura in Italia. Parole, luoghi e pratiche della vio-
lenza pubblica (Roma: DeriveApprodi, 2013); Massimo La Torre & Marina Lalatta
Costerbosa, Legalizzare la tortura? Ascesa e declino dello Stato di diritto (Bologna:
Il Mulino, 2013).
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The stance on torture determined by domestic73 and international
courts is essential for preventing human rights from being eroded, but
it is also necessary that the principles of inviolability of the person
and of human dignity become ingrained in cultural and social con-
sciousness. Only then will torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment be perceived as non-justifiable under any circumstances.
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